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TAX ANALYSTS ®

Why the Corporate AMT
Should Be Retained
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is Irwin I. Cohn Professor
of Law at the University of Michigan.

The corporate AMT is under attack. Repeal has been
proposed by the White House, endorsed by the
ABA/AICPA/TEI tax simplification project, and included in the stimulus bill passed by the House of
Representatives.1 Repeal is supported on two principal
grounds: That the corporate AMT increases complexity,
and that it is pro-cyclical.2
Both of these grounds are questionable. As for complexity, this would principally be an argument for
repealing the individual AMT.3 Corporate AMT payors
can typically deal with complexity (and have to deal
with considerable complexity in their regular tax
returns). In addition, the key issue is transactional complexity, and I will argue below that transactional complexity will actually tend to increase if the corporate
AMT is repealed.
As for the pro-cyclical character of the corporate
AMT, this is only an argument for suspending it, not
for permanent repeal. In addition, as Shaviro notes, the
pro-cyclical character of the AMT can easily be
mitigated by relatively minor changes in it or in the
regular tax.4 There is a danger here of letting the tem-

1

Mohr, “House Barely Approves $160 Billion Economic
Stimulus Bill,” Tax Notes, Oct. 29, 2001, p. 586; for the position
of the Treasury, see p. 995 of this issue.
2
See Daniel Shaviro, “Tax Simplification and the Alternative Minimum Tax,” Tax Notes, May 28, 2001, p. 1455.
3
S i gni f i cant l y, th e Jo i nt C o m m i tte e rep o r t on tax
simplification, issued earlier this year, recommended repeal
of the individual AMT but not of the corporate AMT. I would
support drastically increasing the exemption from individual
AMT so it only affects the taxpayers it was intended to affect
— the top 1 percent of the income distribution, who can also
deal with complexity.
4
Shaviro, supra, note 2.
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porary economic crisis tail wag the long-term tax
policy dog.
In addition, there is one aspect of the corporate AMT
that has been left out of the current debate — its interaction with the corporate tax shelter problem. This
problem has been getting worse recently as the government begins to lose major shelter cases on appeal.5
But it is likely to get even worse if the corporate AMT
is repealed, because of the impact of the ACE adjustment.6
A little history is in order. The ACE adjustment
replaced the book income adjustment that was part of
the corporate AMT from 1986 to 1989. Instead of tying
corporate AMT to book income, it ties it to “adjusted
current earnings,” which is based on earnings and
profits. Earnings and profits are, of course, distinguishable from book income, but they are still closer to book
income than to taxable income (for regular tax purposes).

There is a danger here of letting the
temporary economic crisis tail wag the
long-term tax policy dog.
Professor George Yin has suggested that the solution
to the corporate tax shelter problem may be to tax
public corporations on their book income, as is common in other countries.7 The obvious advantage of
such a proposal is that corporate managers have an
incentive to increase book income, which translates
into earnings per share and affects both the stock price
and their compensation. The incentives of management
thus restrict their tendency to reduce taxable income.
5
See, e.g., United Parcel Service v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d
1014, Doc 2001-17453 (8 original pages), 2001 TNT 122-5 (11th
Cir. 2001); IES Industries v. United States, 2001 US App. Lexis
12881, Doc 2001-16769 (16 original pages), 2001 TNT 116-12 (8th
Cir. 2001).
6
Section 56(g). Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
7
George K. Yin, “Getting Serious About Corporate Tax
Shelters: Taking a Lesson From History,” 54 SMU L. Rev. 209
(2001); see also George K. Yin, “Using Book Earning as the
Default Tax Base for Public Corporations,” Tax Notes, July 2,
2001, p. 135; but see Lee Sheppard, “Corporate Tax Shelters:
Red Herrings and Real Solutions,” Tax Notes, June 18, 2001,
p. 2075.
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This incentive generally overcomes the conservative
nature of book accounting, which is the usual explanation for why book accounting should not be used for
tax purposes.8
It may be no accident that the repeal of the book
income adjustment for corporate AMT purposes in
1989 was followed by a huge increase in the disparity
between book and taxable income in the 1990s. 9 The
discrepancy is only partially accounted for by the
different treatment of stock options, which are deductible when exercised for tax purposes but not for book
purposes.10 One therefore suspects that part of the discrepancy is due to corporate tax shelters.
The ACE adjustment serves as a partial limit to this
trend, since it requires corporations to calculate their
AMTI based in part on adjusted earnings and profits
— a measure closer to book income than to taxable
income. Tax payments by corporations currently
average about 20 percent of book income — down from
about 30 percent after the 1986 Tax Reform Act, and
approximately the same as before the 1986 act.11 Coincidentally or not, 20 percent is also the current rate of
the corporate AMT.12
If the corporate AMT were repealed, there would be
no more limits to the ability of corporate management
to reduce taxable income to zero while reporting high
book income for EPS purposes. Corporate tax sheltering activity would presumably increase, and with it
transactional complexity and litigation activity —
precisely the opposite effect from what true simplification seeks to achieve. This seems a high price to pay
for a temporary stimulus to the economy.13 If the corporate AMT truly has such strong pro-cyclical effects,
let us suspend it for a year and see what happens.

8
See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979)
— not one of Justice Blackmun’s better tax decisions.
9
Martin A. Sullivan, “Study Finds Excess of Book Over Tax
Income Grew in Late 1990s,” Tax Notes, Feb. 5, 2001, p. 717.
It would be interesting to conduct an empirical study on the
effects of the repeal of the book income adjustment on corporate tax revenues.
10
Id.; see section 83(h); Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, SFAS No. 123; Accounting for Stock Issued to
Employees, APB No. 25.
11
This is just one of the many ways in which the 1986 act
has been reversed by recent developments. The tax rates have
increased, the base has shrunk, the capital gains preference
has been reintroduced, and we are back in the pre-1986 mess.
12
Section 55(b)(1)(B)(i).
13
Some, including the Secretary of the Treasury, would of
course prefer to see the corporate tax repealed altogether.
That will indeed be a simplifying move, but it may have other
costs, which should be debated directly.
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